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Many industries and “sectors” of a modern economy display the interaction
of private and public agents which forms the topic of this seminar. A ﬁrst
approximation classiﬁcation identiﬁes three broad types of situations, which
beyond the prima facie similarity, are however radically diﬀerent in origin and
nature.
• Traditional goods markets, such as cars, ships or steel manufacturers, or
traditional insurers, and so on. A loose generalisation is that these mar-
kets started oﬀ as fully private markets, and some ﬁrms became public at
a later stage, that is, they were nationalised. Unlike many of the public
utilities, which were nationalised with a view to prevent monopoly suppli-
ers of essential services from exploiting their monopoly power, and where,
typically, the entire industry was taken over by the state sector, ﬁrms
in these industries were nationalised to stop them from going bankrupt,
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90-98 Goswell Street, London EC1V 7DB, UK; email: defraja@le.ac.uk.which could have labour market, and other economic social and political
negative consequences, and therefore, following nationalisation, operated
i nt h es a m em a r k e ta st h eﬁrms which remained private.
• Recent dramatic ﬁnancial events have brought about the creation of a
totally new and utterly unexpected new sector where private and public
organisation vie to supply the same customers: several banks in several
OECD countries have been eﬀectively nationalised. As history repeats
itself, a model often cited is the partial nationalisation of three Swedish
banks in the late 1980’s (Forsta Sparbanken, Nordbanken, and Gota
Bank, which led the government to own over a ﬁfth of the country’s
banking assets for a brief period). The general consensus seems to be
that this situation should be short lived, but given the importance of the
sector, it is essential that economic theory provides some understanding
of the eﬀects of the interaction among state-owned agents and private
suppliers.
• A third group of markets where public and private agents interact are
those for goods associated with the welfare state, such as health, educa-
tion, pension provision, social housing, and so on. These have a longer
history of public involvement in provision, though this is far from exclu-
sive. State schools were absent in Europe and in the US at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, and widespread one hundred years later,
though not necessarily free to all users, and private schools have con-
tinued to exist and prosper in most countries alongside public providers
of educational services. In the 1880’s, under Bismarck’s Chancellorship,
the German state began to provide accident, health and pension insur-
ance. At the same time, other schemes, like those in Scandinavia, were
based largely on the provision of beneﬁts though mutualist arrangements,
essentially private in nature. The National Health Service, created in
Britain in 1948, nationalised the entire provision of health care, and in
the years that followed many other countries, with the notable absence
of the US, followed the lead with substantial public sector involvement
in health care provision.
In these situations, just like in any environment with diﬀerent agents, in-
teraction must obey some rules, and the role of a competition authority is
to ensure that rules are obeyed. I argue in this paper that in order for the
2competition authority to assess the fairness of certain behaviours to ascertain
whether or not rules have been broken, it is indispensable to know the objective
functions of the agents in the market, and to understand the consequences of
the interaction of agents with diﬀerent objectives. The ownership of a ﬁrm or
an agency will aﬀect its objective, and diﬀerent objectives will lead to diﬀerent
behaviours, which in turn might aﬀect diﬀerently other ﬁr m so ra g e n c i e si n
the industry.1 However, there is nothing intrinsically “right” or “wrong” in
having one objective or another. In particular, many agents, both public and
private, pursue a diﬀerent objective from proﬁt maximisation. From a com-
petition policy viewpoint the issue should be whether or not a ﬁrm’s alleged
anti-competitive behaviour is compatible with its objective function. It is only
if it is incompatible that allegations of anti-competitive behaviour should be
investigated and deterred. Put diﬀerently, evidence of anti-competitive be-
haviour is not tantamount to evidence of anti-competitive intent; the latter
is illegal, but the former is not, with the implication that an allegedly anti-
competitive behaviour should be prosecuted only if is incompatible with the
achievement of the objective function of the public entity in question.2
The paper explores the consequences of this argument in the three broad
classes of situations illustrated above, and shows that, when private and public
agents interact, diﬀerences in objective function between them will lead to
diﬀerences in observed dimensions of performance, often in unexpected and
counterintuitive ways.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the well established
model of mixed oligopoly, Section 3 sketches a very simple and tentative an-
alytical model for the analysis of the interaction between private and public
banks. Section 4 discusses how the interaction between public and private
provider of services funded by the state should be organised.
1Note that, as a consequence of their interaction, a ﬁrm will in general prefer its competi-
tors to have an objective function rather than another.
2A football example may clarify the situation. A mid-table team may ﬁeld a team with
many reserve players in the ﬁnal game of the league for a variety of reasons: if it does so
because it has been promised a large payment by the opposition, which needs to win the
game to clinch the championship, then the behaviour is illegal. If it does so because it wants
to rest some of its ﬁrst team players in view of the crucial mid-week cup game or because
i tw a n t st og i v es o m eﬁrst team experience to its young promising academy players, then
the behaviour is perfectly compatible with the spirit of the game. The behaviour may be
t h es a m e—ﬁelding a weak team —, but the legality of the behaviour must be ascertained in
relation to the objectives being pursued through that behaviour.
32 Traditional “mixed oligopoly” theory.
Early theoretical interest in the interaction between public and private ﬁrms
began in the 1980’s, at the time when game theory was inﬂuencing the analysis
of ﬁrms with market power. Just as with the interaction between proﬁtm a x -
imising ﬁrms, counterintuitive results are often obtained. For example, De
Fraja and Delbono (1989) showed that, if a public ﬁrm may wish to maximise
industry welfare, its pursuit of this objective in interaction with private proﬁt
maximiser ﬁrms will lead it to obtain a greater proﬁt than that obtained by
its otherwise identical private competitors.
The archetypal model can be presented in a very simple case (based on
Cremer et at 1989).
Consider the market for a homogenous good. The demand function is linear
and can be normalised to
Q =1− p
where Q is the total quantity the consumers buy when the price is p.T h e r e
are two ﬁrms, one private, one public. They both produce in condition of no
ﬁxed costs, and constant marginal and average cost. This is (normalised to)
0 for the private ﬁrm, and to c>0 for the public ﬁrm. The additional cost
reﬂects the idea that the public ﬁrm is less eﬃcient (I’ll come the the possible
causes for this later). The private ﬁrm is a proﬁt-maximiser. The objective
function of the public ﬁrm is instead the maximisation of the total surplus
in the industry, given by the sum of the two ﬁrms’ proﬁta n dt h ec o n s u m e r s ’
surplus, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the consumers’ total willingness to
pay for the quantity of the good they consume and what they actually pay for
it. Firms compete in quantity, that is they simultaneously and independently
choose the quantity each supplies, and the price adjusts to clear the market.
Let qs and qp the quantity produced by the two ﬁrms, with subscript p and
s mnemonics for “private” and “state-owned”. The equilibrium in this market




πp =( 1− qs − qp)qp (1)
max
qs





(1) is the proﬁt obtained by the private ﬁrm. In (2), the ﬁrst term is the
private ﬁrms’ proﬁt, the second the state-owned ﬁrm’s proﬁta n dt h el a s tt h e
4consumers’ surplus, measured by the area between the demand curve and the




Which determines a price of c. This implies that the state ﬁrm produces a
quantity such that the market price equals its marginal cost: in the absence of a
private competitor, this corresponds exactly to the conditions for maximisation
of welfare of a public ﬁrm operating in conditions on monopoly (derived long
ago by Boiteux 1956). The public ﬁrm breaks even (its proﬁti s0)a n dt h e
private ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt.3
Notice here the possibility of a perception of unfairness: if there were any
ﬁxed costs, the public ﬁrm would be unable (unlike its private counterpart)
to cover them with a positive price-cost margin, and would incur losses which
would then need to be funded by the taxpayer.
One drawback of the model is that it does not explain the diﬀerence in eﬃ-
ciency between the private and the public ﬁrms, but it assumes it exogenously.
This appears ad hoc and unsatisfactory: what is the source of the diﬀerent
eﬃciency level? In other words, why can’t the public ﬁrm copy the technol-
ogy used by the private ﬁrm? This higher slack (or X-ineﬃciency, Leibenstein
1966) in public ﬁrms is sometimes attributed to the fact that they enjoy a
soft budget constraint, which allows them to survive even if they incur losses,
and protects them from the rigorous discipline of a competitive environment.
Public ﬁrms, it is claimed, are under pressure to increase employment (Boy-
cko et al 1996), or give a low priority to ability in selecting their employees
(Krueger 1990) for political reasons, and this increases their costs. As Vickers
and Yarrow (1988) however point out, equally plausible are stories which can
justify lower eﬃciency in a private ﬁrm. For example, in wage negotiations
with a union, a private ﬁrm operating in a noncompetitive environment may
also survive with some X-ineﬃciency, and may have weaker incentive to drive
a hard wage bargain, as it does not obtain any additional beneﬁt from building
a reputation of toughness to the same extent that the government owner of
the public ﬁrm would, given that the government will be involved in further
3Theoretically, an intriguing feature of this equilibrium is that the two ﬁrms behave exactly
as they would in a standard duopoly where they compete in price and the marginal cost of
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is lower than the industry monopoly price.
5wage negotiations with diﬀerent unions.4
To endogenise cost diﬀerences suppose that the technology displays in-
creasing returns to scale, at least beyond a certain level of output. To proceed





Where c =1for the private ﬁrm, and c > 1, for the public ﬁrm. Repeating
the analysis carried out above for the linear technology, the two ﬁrms’s output
will be the simultaneous solution of the following problems:
max
qp




















Carrying out the optimisation one gets:
qs =
1+k
1+k +2 ck + ck2,( 3 )
qp =
k
1+k +2 ck + ck2;( 4 )
which gives a price of
ck
1+k
1+k +2 ck + ck2,( 5 )













(1 + k +2 ck + ck2)
2.( 7 )
The following are immediate consequences of (3)-(7).
Corollary 1 The public ﬁrm’s marginal cost equals the market price.
Corollary 2 For every value of c > 1,t h ep u b l i cﬁrm has a higher output, a
higher marginal cost, and a higher average cost than the private ﬁrm.
4Diﬀerence in eﬃciency between private and public agencies are attributed to the by
Dewatripont et al (1999) to the nature of the objectives, ie whether they are speciﬁco r
fuzzy and multiple. This tallies well with the observation that public agencies with a clearly
speciﬁed objective tend to perform better.






then the public ﬁrm’s proﬁt is higher than the
private ﬁrm’s.
According to Corollary 2, any observed higher costs in a public ﬁrm need
not necessarily be caused by lower eﬃciency, but may happen even when the
two ﬁrms used the same underlying technology (c =1 )a n ds i m p l yb eac o n -
sequence of the combination of the facts (i) that public ﬁrms produce more
and (ii) that this technology has decreasing returns to scale. Corollary 3 ex-
tends the previous analysis. The public ﬁrm makes more proﬁtf o ri t s e l f ,e v e n
though its objective function is not the maximisation of its own proﬁt. Welfare
maximisation makes the public ﬁrm very keen to increase output: this leaves a
smaller potential market to the private ﬁrm (that is a lower residual demand,
than it would have if its competitor were another private proﬁt maximising
ﬁrm. Facing a smaller market, the private ﬁrm will restrict output: in the end,
even though it can produce more cheaply than the public ﬁrm, the lower sales
drive its proﬁt below the public ﬁrms, unless the cost diﬀerence is very high.5
The intuition for this surprising result is in fact quite straightforward. It is
a consequence solely of the oligopolistic interaction: in condition of monopoly,
a public ﬁrm will produce to its break-even output level, forgoing monopoly
proﬁt in pursuit of lower prices, which are beneﬁcial to consumers. In the
presence of competitors, it behaves in the same way: because it beneﬁts more
than private ﬁrms from an increase in output, the public ﬁrm does produce
more than the private ﬁrms. But because it does not need to produce as
much as it would in monopoly condition, it earns the price mark-up over a
greater output, even if the mark-up itself is lower, and it makes higher proﬁts,
even though it may produce less eﬃciently.6 And clearly it does not seem
unreasonable for a public ﬁrm to try to maximise industry welfare, rather that
its own proﬁt. If one takes the view that pursuing an objective in line with the
owners’ wider goals should not be seen per se as an anticompetitive practice,
then welfare maximisation should be a perfectly acceptable goal, just as it is
5Note that both ﬁrms charge the same price. This is the consequence of the Cournot
assumption that they supply identical goods. With product diﬀerentiation, public ﬁrms
charge lower prices. For example Sapienza (2004) ﬁnd this to be the in the banking market
(more on which later).
6Of course that a ﬁrm which sets out to do something other than maximising proﬁt, may
end up making more proﬁt than it would if it had set out to maximise proﬁti saw e l lk n o w n
and understood fact in the presence of strategic interaction (Vickers 1985, which build on the
seminal insight of Schelling 1960 shows that rewarding managers with a bonus depending on
sales is consistent with proﬁt maximisation).
7for state schools to provide free education, or for state hospitals to provide free
medical care, even though these behaviours also reduce the ability of private
institutions to pursue their own objectives.
Notice the crucial role of the objective function: precisely because the pub-
lic ﬁrm wants to maximise welfare, it needs to produce more: any other be-
lievable objective which would induce a public ﬁrm to increase output beyond
what a proﬁt maximiser would do would achieve the same eﬀect. One typical
example is the sustainment of employment in industries which are politically
or socially considered deserving taxpayer support. A private proﬁt-maximising
competitor will be induced to reduce its own output and will therefore see its
proﬁt reduced as a consequence of a credible commitment by the public ﬁrm
to pursue such objective.
3 An instructive very simple banking story.
A likely development in the banking industry is that public ownership of banks
will be a temporary phenomenon (eg Richardson 2009). Moreover, following
the Swedish example, bad debts might be allocated to portions of the banks
intended to remain in public ownership for a longer period, with good loans
assigned instead to parts of the company to be privatised as soon as possible
as separate entities. In this case a strong asymmetry between private and
public banks, in addition to their objective function, would remain. But the
size of the public sector share and the likely time span of the current industry
structure suggest that banking will indeed be a mixed oligopoly at least for a
few years.7 And so the study of a model of which provided insight into the
interaction of private and public ﬁrms has more than academic interest.
A simple model, contained in De Fraja and Iossa (2009), which isolates the
role of the objective function as the sole diﬀerence between public and private
banks could be the following.
There are two banks and an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has a project,
which can be good or bad. Financing from one of the two banks is necessary for
the project to be completed: with no funding the project is not carried out, and
everyone’s payoﬀ is (normalised to) 0. The payoﬀ to the entrepreneur is always
non-negative, and so she wants to always carry out the project irrespective of
the value.
7In many developing countries co-existence of public and private banks is a long term
situation (Andrianova et al 2008).
8The entrepreneur chooses one bank (randomly) and asks it for a loan to
ﬁnance the project. If the loan requested is provided, the entrepreneur runs
the project and the game ends. If funding for the project is refused, the
entrepreneur goes to the other bank, and again asks it to ﬁnance the project.
The project is run if it is ﬁnanced by one bank, and the game ends.
If a project is completed then the proﬁt to the bank is VG > 0, if the project
is good and VB < 0 if the project is bad. I assume that the expected value of
the project is positive:
gVG +( 1− g)VB > 0 (8)
where g is the prior probability that the project is good.
A bank can be competent or incompetent. A competent bank observes
perfectly the quality of the project, whereas the incompetent bank has no
information about it. We begin with the benchmark case where both banks
are private, and aim to maximise their own proﬁt.
It is easy to see that the competent bank has an easy choice to make: it
ﬁnances the project if it is good and it does not if it is bad. The incompetent
bank, on the other hand, has a more complicated problem, because it needs to
maximise in conditions of uncertainty. For the sake of deﬁniteness, I assume
that the second bank knows whether funding for a project has been applied
for and rejected. The formulae would be diﬀerent in the opposite case, but
conceptually the analysis would be similar.
Proposition 1 If both banks are private, then the ﬁrst incompetent bank ﬁ-
nances the project, the second does not.
The intuition for this result is the following. Given the behaviour of the
ﬁrst bank, the second bank understands that the only possibility for the project
to be refused ﬁnance is for it to be bad and for the ﬁr s tb a n kt ob ec o m p e t e n t .
It therefore knows that a rejected project is bad, and reject it itself. The ﬁrst
bank, on the other hand, simply maximises its expected proﬁt, and because
(8) holds, it ﬁnances the project if it is incompetent.
Now consider the case where one bank is public. As before, it seems nat-
ural to posit that the payoﬀ of the private bank is its own proﬁt, the payoﬀ
of the public bank is total industry proﬁt, that is the sum of the proﬁto ft h e
private and the public bank (for the sake of simplicity let the proﬁto ft h ee n -
trepreneur be small, for example because she operate in a competitive market:
a richer model, where the entrepreneur’s proﬁt is non-negligible, would give
9similar qualitative results). Given the very secondary role of the second bank
in Proposition 1, the following is not surprising.
Proposition 2 Let the ﬁrst bank approached be the private one. Then the
ﬁrst incompetent bank ﬁnances the project, the second never does.
In Propositions 1 and 2, the probability that a good project is ﬁnanced is
1, and the probability that a bad project is ﬁnanced is (1 − γ).A s u m m a r y
measure of the quality of the organisation of the industry can be given with
reference to the following magnitude:
gVG +( 1− g)(1− γ)VB (9)
The above can be deﬁned as “private oligopoly value of the overall project”,
and is a diﬀerent concept from the LHS of (8), in that it embodies the quality
of the banks decision making (and so it increases with g). Ideally, of course
one would wish to ﬁnance only good projects, which would give a “private
oligopoly value of the overall project” of gVG.
Interestingly, it turns out that the behaviour of the public bank when it is
approached ﬁrst is diﬀerent depending on the “private oligopoly value of the
overall project”, (9). To the extent that the value of the project correlates with
the business cycle, we can roughly say that if the economy is in an expansion
(recession) phase, the “private oligopoly value of the overall project” is high
(low). High is deﬁned for parameter combinations such that
(1 − γ)gVG +( 1− g)VB > 0 (10)
Notice that a project can have a positive expected value (that is (8) holds),
and a negative “private oligopoly value of the overall project” (that is (10) is
violated). Consider the case in which the ﬁrst bank approached is the public
one. It is useful to distinguish two cases.
Proposition 3 Let the ﬁrst bank approached be the public one, and let (10)
be violated (recession). Then neither incompetent bank ﬁnances the project.
Recall that if the ﬁrst bank is private and incompetent, then it ﬁnances the
project (Propositions 1 and 2). So Proposition 3 says that the presence of the
public bank reduces the probability of ﬁnancing of a project. In particular, a
good project is accepted if either bank is competent, that is with probability
101−(1 − γ)
2. A bad project is never accepted. The value of the overall project
in this case is:
g
³




Note that (11) is greater than (9) (recall we are in the “recession” case): the
presence of the public bank improves the payoﬀ to society because all bad
projects are rejected, even if this comes at the cost of rejecting a good project
with some positive probability. Since in recession there are few good project
rejecting a fraction of them is less costly than accepting some bad projects. The
public bank, in a recession, behaves more conservatively than a private bank
would in identical circumstances. Note that this stands at odds with what is
advocated that public banks should try to increase their lending. Intuitively,
the public bank’s payoﬀ improves when the second bank is competent, because
only good projects are accepted: if the public bank accepted every project (as
an incompetent private counterpart would), then the second bank would play
no role: it would reject the project if it is asked for ﬁnance, and does not
consider it if the ﬁrst bank has ﬁnanced it. But to the extent that the public
bank beneﬁts from the second bank being competent, if the public bank is
incompetent it should “delegate” the ﬁnancing decision to the second ﬁrm.
Note that when the second bank is incompetent, it does not ﬁnance the
project. This is unlike the case where it chooses ﬁrst, because the fact that it
receives the project conveys some information, and aﬀects its belief that the
project is good.
Proposition 4 Let the ﬁrst bank approached be the public one, and let (10)
hold (expansion). There are three equilibria. In one equilibrium the ﬁrst in-
competent bank ﬁnances the project, the second incompetent bank (if called to)
does not; in a second equilibrium, the ﬁrst incompetent bank does not ﬁnance
the project, the second incompetent bank (if called to) does ﬁnance it. In a
third equilibrium, both incompetent banks ﬁnance the project with probability
1
1−γ +z






In each of the three equilibria, the behaviour of both banks is independent
of its ownership.
The dry technical description of the equilibria given in the statement invites
a more illustrative discussion. Consider the equilibrium where the ﬁrst incom-
petent public bank funds the project. This equilibrium is exactly the same as
the one with two private banks: the second (private) bank never ﬁnances the
11project, because it knows that the ﬁrst bank (either public or private) only
rejects bad proposals. The public bank is however more conservative than the
private bank, that is it has a higher threshold for funding a project, because
it internalises the possibility that it is incompetent.
Consider the converse equilibrium: here the incompetent public bank does
not fund the project: because it is possible that the private bank is in fact
competent, it lets it decide whether the project should be funded: given the
move, the private bank is not pessimist, it understand the strategy followed
by the public bank, and knows that a refusal to fund could be due either to
the bank being competent and knowing that the project is bad, or to the bank
being incompetent and following its equilibrium strategy. Given the relative
probability of these events, if will fund the project if the (10) holds. In both
these equilibria, the project is accepted with probability 1 if it is good, and is
funded with probability (1 − γ) if it is bad, exactly the same as in a private
oligopoly. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, on the other hand, a good project
















While potentially intriguing, mixed strategy equilibria are in this case not
fully intuitive, and can be ruled out by an economics argument: the public
bank can choose one of the two equilibria as a focal point (eg by announcing
that it will be conservative in its lending).
The exact details of the equilibrium aside, this very simple model illustrates
again the simple point that the objective function of the public ﬁrm aﬀects the
behaviour and payoﬀ of all agents in the industry.
4 Public-private competition in the welfare state
The industries considered above are traditionally private: in contemporary
western societies, public provision in these industries is either a temporary
response to an emergency situation, or considered justiﬁed on the basis of
some special characteristics of the industry where public suppliers operate.
In other sectors of economic activity, public involvement has a wider po-
litical acceptance, and is widespread, albeit with remarkable variation from
sector to sector and from country to country.
In order to understand this wide variety of modes of public intervention,
it is important to separate conceptually provision and funding,e v e nt h o u g h
12they are often confused by political and media commentators.
1. The service is supplied to ﬁnal consumers by a state agency, which has
the monopoly right to supply.
2. The service is supplied by private proﬁt maximising contractors, either
by multiple competing private suppliers, or in monopoly conditions, for
example following a competitive auction for the right to be the ex-post
sole supplier among ex-ante competing private suppliers. Typically the
buyer is a public agency.
3. The service is supplied by multiple suppliers, not necessarily all private
proﬁt maximisers: the price paid by consumers is independent of the
type of ownership of the supplier.
4. As in 3, but with the price instead depending on the type of ownership
of the supplier.
Essentially all state activities can be classiﬁed in one of the above cate-
gories. These are some examples.
1. Police protection, national security, defence, crime prosecution.
2. Practically all public procurement, from road building to ancillary ser-
vices (cleaning hospital, re-cycling, school meals) to PFI in the building
and running of prisons, hospitals, schools, and so on.
3. Medical care where patients can use private or public hospitals at the
same cost, typically 0; some school voucher systems (where the voucher
covers the full cost).
4. Pension provision, housing, and schools (in the absence of a full voucher)
a r ea m o n gt h ee x a m p l e so ft h i sc a s e .
Notice that the pattern of provision varies greatly among these services.
Police protection and defence are publicly provided in practically every coun-
try. The administration of justice is publicly provided, whereas its necessary
counterpart, legal representation, is typically privately provided, even when
it is publicly ﬁnanced through legal aid. On the other hand, there are many
services, health and education among them, which are publicly provided in
13some countries, almost entirely private in others, and partly publicly partly
privately provided in yet other countries.8
A common thread among all of these services identiﬁed by De Fraja (2008)
is the role of human capital in the quality of provision. This is very important
for these sectors, and I argue in that paper that the ability of workers in
these sectors to deliver a quality much is strongly aﬀected by the interaction
with fellow workers while at work: “a doctor will ﬁnd it easier to perform an
operation well or to make a correct diagnosis if her assistants are well trained
or if she can readily obtain a second opinion from an experienced colleague.
Police oﬃcers, teachers, and the military all ﬁnd the performance of their
duties easier [...] if those they cooperate with in the pursuit of criminals, in
t h ec l a s s r o o m ,a n di nt h eb a t t l e ﬁeld are ‘good colleagues’, dedicated, capable
and well trained” (De Fraja 2008, p 965). The analysis in that paper highlights
that the nature of the human capital externality aﬀects the incentives of public
and private providers in a diﬀerent way, because of their diﬀerent objectives,
and so the two modes of provision may diﬀer in the cost of training, and so
the amount of training they provide.9
Here I want to argue that the role of training has important implications
for the acceptability, from a competition authority’s viewpoint, of tax ﬁnanced
subsidies to public suppliers of these services.
In traditional markets public ﬁrms must compete “fairly” with private
ﬁrms. Thus, for example, it is to be assumed that article 87 of the EU treaty,
prohibiting “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources
in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods” applies to
8Note also how the mode of provision has switched quite radically in the course of history:
education was originally provided by private tutors and private schools, to be extensively
nationalised as it became compulsory; in many western countries the trend now seems to be
reversing towards more private provision (while keeping public funding). In Renaissance Italy
defence was provided privately: cities did not maintain defence capability, but hired small
mercenary armies if and when they needed to engage in wars: the ﬁrst “modern” publicly
ﬁnanced, publicly provided armies appeared in Europe around the time of the thirty years
war (1618-48); before them, armies were feudal in nature, private properties of the local
lords. Another example is ﬁre protection: nowadays is publicly provided and funded almost
everywhere. In 1791 London, it was provided by three private “Insurance” companies: the
ﬁrst public ﬁre brigade in Britain was established in Edinburgh in as recently as 1824.
9And moreover that potentially small changes in the technology of provision could ﬂick the
“better” mode of provision from private to public and vice versa, which could be a possible
explanation of the diﬀerences from country to country and across time in the same country.
14state-owned ﬁr m sa sw e l l ,e ﬀectively constraining the possibility of subsidising
the price at which a public ﬁrm supplies its customers. Certainly, a state-
owned chain of hotels which were to provide below cost services would need
to be in exceptional circumstances if it were to avoid challenges by private
hoteliers.
And yet private schools, universities or hospitals do not complain about
state-owned subsidised suppliers.10 It is diﬃcult to see that the fact that
private schools and hospitals are not-for-proﬁt organisations should be a suf-
ﬁcient reason to justify the diﬀerence in treatment: after all a private school
will have an objective function, and the diﬃculty it encounters in recruiting
students must inevitably make more diﬃcult for it to achieve its objectives.
I argue here that these diﬀerences in the degree of opposition to public sub-
sidies to certain goods for consumers who purchase them from public entities
can be explained with reference to the human capital training content of their
provision.
To begin to form an intuition for this, let us consider the following goods
and services, grouped according to the role and importance of training:
• primary and secondary education, health, tertiary education;
• police protection, defence;
• pension provision and social housing;
• “traditional” state owned enterprises (eg car manufacturers or utilities).
In the ﬁrst group of services, human capital is a very important input
in production. In practice, the training necessary to create human capital
is nowadays overwhelmingly provided by public suppliers. Many doctors, af-
ter university, train and practice in public hospitals, and, their specialisation
completed, may then work in private hospitals. This career path implies that
private suppliers do not need to incur the cost of training, a cost which can
be substantial, while still enjoying the beneﬁt. Similarly, teachers’ training
programmes and classroom experience take place mainly in publicly owned
schools: it is comparatively rare for teachers to spend their junior years in a
10While there are proposals completely to abolish every public intervention into the provi-
sion of education, they originate from the right wing fringe of US academic institutions (Lott
1987, McGee 1996), and have never been remotely considered by any US administration, let
alone European ones.
15private school to move to the state sector for senior jobs; in academia many
doctoral students receive a subsidy from governments to study at state uni-
versities, and may then go to work for private universities.
In the second group of services, human capital is also very important, and
again it is provided chieﬂy by public sector organisations. As in the ﬁrst group,
there is a considerable spillover from public to private agencies: many airline
pilots trained as air-force pilots, and many security guards and consultants
are ex-army or ex-police oﬃcers. The symmetric career move, from private to
public sector providers, is much rarer. But, if human capital side is common
to private and public providers, the diﬀerence with the services in the ﬁrst
group is on the demand side: the public sector entity operates in a situation
of (typically legal) monopoly and therefore the taxpayer’s contribution to the
cost of their activity does not directly aﬀect private suppliers.
In the third and the fourth groups of services, human capital is a relatively
small component of the cost of provision. This might be because the degree of
standardisation is quite high or because “on-the-job-training” is less important.
Moreover, casual observation suggests that the ﬂow of human capital to and
from the private and public sector is not as strongly asymmetric as for the
services in the ﬁrst and second groups.
Theoretically, this identiﬁes a potential externality bestowed by public or-
ganisations, and to a diﬀerent, but no less important, extent by public ﬁnancing
of human capital: a substantial portion of human capital training in health
and education is ﬁnanced by the state sector through university funding, and
another important portion of training is acquired on-the-job, by teachers, doc-
tors, nurses and so on who spend some of the working life in state schools
and hospitals. Of course there are some workers who join or re-join the pub-
lic sector after spending some time working for, and accumulating valuable
human capital in, the private sector: this is less frequent, and, considering
the fact that medical and teacher training is carried out almost exclusively in
public hospitals11 and schools the balance is likely to tip heavily towards the
externality going from the public sector to the private sector.
So in these markets the negative output/price externality bestowed by the
organisations in the public sector is oﬀset by a positive human capital training
externality. A diﬀerent way of putting is that public organisations produce
two outputs: services to students and patients, and human capital training.
11US medical schools at private universities are an exception: the cost, however, is carried
o u tb ys t u d e n t st h e m s e l v e sb o t hi np r i v a t ea n di np u b l i cm e d i c a ls c h o o l s .
16High output by the public sector implies fewer potential customers for private
operators, but higher supply of qualiﬁed workers. The former reduces demand
for private suppliers, but the latter reduces their costs.
These considerations might explain why private providers in health and
education do not typically complain about unfair competition by tax ﬁnanced
suppliers who charge little or nothing for their services.
It is also the case that private suppliers do not complain about public
subsidies to services in the third group either: housebuilders and ﬁnancial
intermediaries do not complain about subsidised council housing and state
provided old-age pensions. The reason here is not human capital provision,
but quality. These goods are usually supplied by the public sector below cost,
but only in very low qualities: low income individuals may choose to receive
the good in this way, whereas high income households prefer to pay for higher
quality (as theorised by Besley and Coate 1991):12 the objective pursued by
the government is redistribution towards low income households. To the extent
that the higher end of the market is more proﬁtable, as is empirically the case
and as it is predicted by theoretical model (Gabscewitz and Thisse 1979 and
Shaked and Sutton 1982) the free supply by public sector agencies is of little
concern to proﬁt seeking private suppliers, as they would anyway prefer to
supply diﬀerent segments of the market.
Subsidies for some goods and services may therefore be justiﬁed on eﬃ-
ciency ground, to internalise a positive human capital externality, and so that
it is and it may be accepted by private suppliers, as they beneﬁt indirectly
from it because of a steady availability of trained personnel. But how large
should the subsidy be? There is no reason to assume that the optimal subsidy
is equal to the cost of production. It will in general depend on the technology
and the extent of the externality, and may well be higher or lower than the cost
of production. A higher subsidy implies that users are paid to consume the
goods. This does happen occasionally. Examples include paying rural children
to attend primary school (formally compensating them for lost earnings and
12We note that, with incomes growing, the need to provide this services as a redistributive
tool also diminishes, in the very long term, somewhat contradicting Alfred Marshall’s opin-
ion put in 1893 to the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor that state pension provisions
‘do not contain ... the seeds of their own disappearance. I am afraid that, if started, they
would tend to become perpetual’ (Great Britain Parliament. House of Commons (1895), p
543). Privatisation of private housing is another manifestation of the same trend: accord-
ing to Ginsburgh, “direct provision of aﬀordable rented housing by local authorities is fast
disappearing in Britain with the transfer of homes to quasi-private landlords” (2005, p 115).
17travel cost, see Behrman et al 2005), paying tanagers from low income house-
holds to attend non-compulsory school (Dearden et al 2003, Cardoso and Souza
2003). University tuition fees and co-payment for medical care are examples
of a subsidy lower than the cost of production.
An eﬀective way to internalise the human capital externality and at the
same time pursue a redistributive objective is through vouchers. At the mo-
ment vouchers are used mainly in compulsory education. In its essence, a
voucher is a lump sum given to (the parents of) school-age children, which
they can use towards the cost of education at a private institution, while state
schools remain free to those who choose them: households pay only part of the
cost if they choose private education. There is no reason why some form of
vouchers could not be used in health or for other goods ﬁnanced by the public
sector.13 The size of the voucher determines the diﬀerence in the price paid
by those who choose to use the public and the private service, and it is this
diﬀerence that should be of concern to a competition authority: the smaller
the voucher the more diﬃcult for private supplier to remain in the market and
a competition authority may therefore be required to express an opinion as to
the size of the voucher, in order to strike a balance between the government’s
redistributive concern and the beneﬁt of competition.
That a tax ﬁnanced subsidy to, for example, publicly supplied education
is justiﬁed by the training externality rather than a redistributive concern, is
conﬁrmed by the observation that it is not necessarily the case that quality is
lower for the public sector. One would expect that private schools can charge
a positive price — and therefore exist— only if they oﬀer better quality than
the public school. In practice, whether private schools are “better” than state
schools is an empirical point. Surprisingly, relatively few tests have been per-
formed to determine the validity of this conclusion. While Dearden et al (2000,
p 21) ﬁnd that “the impact on educational qualiﬁcations of attending [...] a
private school is large and signiﬁcant”, De Fraja et al (forthcoming) use the
13Paradoxically, the debate about vouchers is hottest in the US, because, in Europe, many
schools which would be considered private in the US typically receive public funding in some
form or other. In the UK many state school are religious, and are allowed to impose criteria
of admission based on the religious attendance of parents schools (many do); until recently,
all private school had “assisted places”: essentially scholarship paid for out of public funds:
while the Labour government elected in 1997 abolished the assisted places scheme, tuition
fees at private schools remain VAT exempt, and this reduces the cost to parents, and is,
in eﬀect, a voucher. In many countries in continental Europe a substantial proportion of
education is privately provided and government funded (see Toma 1996).
18same dataset, but account also for children’s and parents’ eﬀort and ﬁnd that
the eﬀect is mild. Similarly, in a study of Belgium, France, New Zealand, On-
tario and the US, Toma (1996) also ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of private schools on
attainment, but Feinstein and Symons ﬁnd that “contrary to received wisdom
in the UK, attendance at private school is nowhere signiﬁcant” (1999, p 310).
Another UK study, Naylor et al (2002), ﬁnds that university graduates who
had, prior to university, attended a private school, on average obtain better re-
sults at university than graduates who had previously attended a state school
(their ﬁgure is 3.4% for females and 3.1% for males), but their earnings are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. An analogous exercise is performed for Italian students
by Bertola and Checchi (2001), who, on the contrary, ﬁnd that attendance of a
private school prior to university, lowers a student’s performance at university.
One of the beneﬁts that justiﬁes the cost to the taxpayer of a voucher
scheme is the eﬃciency enhancing role of competition from private providers,
which may not be able to survive if households had to pay for the entire value
of the school fees.
Even though this interaction is widespread, and even though there is large
body of work that studies the role of competition in “traditional” markets (eg,
Vining and Boardman 1992 or Dewenter and Malatesta 2001), or in fully public
(quasi-)markets (eg Propper 1996 or Le Grand 1991), evidence investigating
the eﬀects of competition between private and public providers in the welfare
state is scarce. Shleifer 1998 states that competition has a positive eﬀect on
eﬃciency, even though Propper et al (2004) “ﬁnd that the relationship between
competition and quality of care appears to be negative: greater competition
is associated with higher death rates”. Similarly Cellini et al ﬁnd no eﬀect of
competition in the Italian health care market. Other evidence on the eﬀects
of competition is presented in Dranove and White (1994). An earlier analysis
for competition among hospitals, which measured eﬃciency by mortality rates,
found “no statistically signiﬁcant association between mortality rates among
inpatients and either the type of hospital ownership or the number of hospitals
competing in the market area”; but demand side pressure given by enrollment
in health maintenance organizations does however have a positive eﬀect on
eﬃciency (Shortell and Hughes 1988; related work is Hirth 1999, who studies
the role of competition for non-proﬁta g e n c i e s ) .
Coming now to education provision, Brasington (2000) studies quality, and
ﬁnds that the quality in “public school (...) is responsive to private-school
competition but not to competition from other public schools” (p 583). Similar
19results are obtained by Couch et al (1993), which however Newmark (1995) and
Simon and Lovrich (1996), among others, dispute. An interesting work is Allen
and Shen (1999). They consider a private, religious higher education university,
and calculate the cross-price elasticities of its demand for admission with the
tuition fee charged by three other relevant institutions: a public university
located in the same town, a research oriented public university located in the
same state, and a private, secular university located in a neighbouring state.
The main ﬁnding of this paper (which reﬂects the results obtained by other,
older studies, such as McPherson et al 1978) is that public universities do
not in fact aﬀect the admission policy of the private university considered.
This is attributed by the authors to the large diﬀerence in fees between the
two types of institutions. The substitutability between institutions is much
stronger between private universities. This study is clearly interesting, but,
just as clearly, it suﬀers from the limitation of considering one institution only,
and therefore the authors are unable to distinguish from a general causality
relationship between fees and admission and the possibility that local eﬀects
overwhelm the price eﬀects. The topic is clearly an important one, and, in view
of the importance that issue of competition between schools and universities
is likely to play in the future, it seems important that more research is carried
out.
5 Concluding remarks.
Interaction between private and public entities is hugely important, and while
the playing ﬁeld has shifted from traditional ﬁrms to providers of public sector
services such and health and education, it will clearly be a fundamental feature
of developed economies for the foreseeable feature.
I argue here that whether a taxpayer ﬁnanced subsidy to some suppliers
(typically the public ones) is tantamount to “unfair” competition should be
assessed with the understanding of the nature of the objective function of
the providers: behaviour which would be deemed anti-competitive for a proﬁt
maximising oligopolist, may be in line with the objective function of a public,
welfare-maximising supplier.
On the other hand, where the presence of public suppliers bestows a posi-
tive externality on the private suppliers, for example in the form of the supply
of human capital training, then a taxpayer ﬁnanced subsidy distributed asym-
metrically to the players in the sector according to their ownership may beneﬁt
20all suppliers, private and public alike. The paper closes highlighting the role
of vouchers in providing a subsidy to public suppliers which is less than the
cost of supply, whilst maintaining the principle that the users of the publicly
provided service receive at no cost.
References
Allen, Robert F and Jianshou Shen (1999), “Some new evidence of the character of
competition among higher education institutions.” Economics of Education Review,
18, 465—470.
Andrianova, Svetlana, Panicos Demetriades, and Anja Shortland (2008), “Government
ownership of banks, institutions and ﬁnancial development.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 85, 218—252.
Behrman, Jere R, Piyali Sengupta, and Petra Todd (2005), “Progressing through
PROGRESA: An impact assessment of a school subsidy experiment in rural Mex-
ico.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54, 237—275.
Bertola, Giuseppe and Daniele Checchi (2001), “Sorting and private education in
Italy.” Lavoro e Relazioni Industriali, 2, 87—124.
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1991), “Public provision of public goods and the
redistribution of income.” American Economic Review, 81, 979—84.
Boiteux, Marcel (1956), “Sur la gestion des monopoles publiques astreints á l’èquilibre
budgètaire.” Econometrica, 24, 22—40.
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny (1996), “A theory of privati-
sation.” T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l , 106, 310—319.
Brasington, David M (2000), “Demand and supply of public school quality in
metropolitan areas: The role of private schools.” Journal of Regional Science, 40,
583—605.
Cardoso, Eliana and Andre Portela Souza (2003), “The impact of cash transfers on
child labor and school attendance in Brazil.” Mimeo, University of Sao Paulo.
Cellini, Roberto, Giacomo Pignataro, and Ilde Rizzo (2000), “Competition and eﬃ-
ciency in health care: An analysis of the Italian case.” International Tax and Public
Finance, 7, 503—519.
Couch, Jim F, William F Shughart, and Al L Williams (1993), “Private school enroll-
ment and public school performance.” Public Choice, 76, 301—312.
21Cremer, Helmut, Maurice Marchand, and Jacques F Thisse (1989), “The public ﬁrm
as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market.” Oxford Economic Papers,
41, 283—301.
Cremer, Helmut, Maurice Marchand, and Jacques F Thisse (1991), “Mixed oligopoly
with diﬀerentiated products.” International Journal of Industrial Organization,9 ,
43—53.
De Fraja, Gianni (2008), “Market and public provision in the presence of human
capital externalities.” Journal of Public Economics, 92, 962—985.
De Fraja, Gianni and Flavio Delbono (1989), “Alternative strategies of a public en-
terprise in oligopoly.” Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302—11.
De Fraja, Gianni and Elisabetta Iossa (2009), “Career Concerns and the Ownership
of Banks.” Mimeo.
De Fraja, Gianni, Tania Oliveira, and Luisa Zanchi (2009), “Must try harder. Evalu-
ating the role of eﬀort on examination results.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming.
Dearden, Lorraine, Carl Emmerson, Christine Frayne, and Costas Meghir (2003),
“The impact of ﬁnancial incentives on education choice.” Presented at the CEPR
meeting, The Economics of Education, Paris.
Dearden, Lorraine, Javier Ferri, and Costas Meghir (2000), “The eﬀect of school
quality on educational attainment and wages.” Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt, and Jean Tirole (1999), “The economics of ca-
reer concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of government
agencies,.” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 199—217.
Dewenter, Kathryn L and Paul H Malatesta (2001), “State-owned and privately owned
ﬁrms: An empirical analysis of proﬁtability, leverage, and labor intensity.” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 91, 3230—334.
Dranove, David and William D White (1994), “Recent theory and evidence on com-
petition in hospital markets.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,3 ,
169—209.
Feinstein, Leon and James Symons (1999), “Attainment in secondary school.” Oxford
Economic Papers, 51, 300—321.
Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold and Jacques F Thisse (1979), “Price competition, quality
and income disparities.” Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 340—59.
22Ginsburg, Norman (2005), “The privatization of council housing.” Critical Social Pol-
icy, 25, 115—135.
Grand, Julian Le (1991), “Quasi-markets and social policy.” Economic Journal, 101,
1256—1267.
Hirth, Richard A (1999), “Consumer information and competition between nonproﬁt
and for-proﬁt nursing homes.” Journal of Health Economics, 18, 219—240.
Krueger, Anne O (1990), “Government failures in development.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 4/3, 3—20.
Leibenstein, Harvey (1966), “Allocative eﬃciency versus X-eﬃciency.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 56, 392—415.
Lott, John R (1987), “Why is education publicly provided. A critical survey.” Cato
Journal, 475—501.
McGee, Robert W (1996), “A solution to the education crisis.” The Dumont Institute
for Public Policy Research, Dumont, NJ.
McPherson (1978), “The demand for higher education.” In Public Policy and Private
Higher Education (David W Breneman and Chester E Finnand Susan C Nelson,
eds.), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
Naylor, Robin, Jeremy Smith, and Abigail McKnight (2002), “Why is there a graduate
earnings premium for students from independent schools?” Bulletin of Economic
Research, 54, 315—340.
Newmark, Craig M (1995), “Another look at whether private schools inﬂuence public-
school quality - comment.” Public Choice, 82, 365—373.
Propper, Carol (1996), “Market structure and prices: The responses of hospitals in
the UK national health service to competition.” Journal of Public Economics, 61,
307—335.
Propper, Carol, Simon Burgess, and Katherine Green (2004), “Does competition be-
tween hospitals improve the quality of care?: Hospital death rates and the NHS
internal market.” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1247—1272.
Richardson, Matthew (2009), “The case for and against bank nationalisation.” Vox,
www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3143.
Sapienza, Paola (2004), “The eﬀects of government ownership on bank lending.” Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 72, 357—384.
Schelling, Thomas C (1960), The Strategy of Conﬂict. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
23Shaked, Avner and John Sutton (1982), “Relaxing price competition through product
diﬀerentiation.” Review of Economic Studies, 49, 3—14.
Shortell, S M and E F Hughes (1988), “The eﬀects of regulation, competition, and
ownership on mortality rates among hospital inpatients.” New England Journal of
Medicine, 318, 1100—1107.
Simon, Christopher A and Nicholas P Lovrich Jr (1996), “Private school enrolment
and public school performance: Assessing the eﬀects of competition upon public
school student achievement in Washington state.” Policy Study Journal, 24, 666—
675.
Toma, Eugenia Froedge (1996), “Public funding and private schooling across coun-
tries.” Journal of Law and Economics, 39, 121—148.
Vickers, John (1985), “Delegation and the theory of the ﬁrm.” Economic Journal, 95,
138—47.
Vickers, John and George Yarrow (1988), Privatisation: An Economic Analysis.M I T
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Vining, Aidan and Anthony E Boardman (1992), “Ownership versus competition:
Eﬃciency in public enterprise.” Public Choice, 73, 205—239.
24